@inproceedings {24085,
	title = {Algebraic Analysis of LEX},
	journal = {Australasian Information Security Conference, AISC2009},
	volume = {98},
	year = {2009},
	pages = {33-45},
	publisher = {ACS},
	abstract = {LEX is a stream cipher that progressed to Phase 3 of the eSTREAM stream cipher project. In this paper, we show that the security of LEX against algebraic attacks relies on a small equation system not being solvable faster than exhaustive search. We use the byte leakage in LEX to construct a system of 21 equations in 17 variables. This is very close to the require- ment for an efficient attack, i.e. a system containing 16 variables. The system requires only 36 bytes of keystream, which is very low.},
	keywords = {Advanced Encryption Standard, LEX, Stream Cipher},
	isbn = {978-1-920682-79-8},
	issn = {1445-1336},
	url = {http://crpit.com/abstracts/CRPITV98RezaZaba.html},
	author = {Muhammad Reza {Z{\textquoteright}aba} and Raddum, H{\r a}vard and Simpson, Leonie and Dawson, Ed and Henricksen, Matt and Wong, Kenneth}
}
