@inproceedings {28409,
	title = {On Evaluating Anonymity of Onion Routing},
	journal = {Selected Areas in Cryptography (28th International Conference, Virtual Event, September 29 {\textendash} October 1, 2021, Revised Selected Papers)},
	volume = {13203},
	year = {2022},
	pages = {3-24},
	publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland},
	address = {Cham},
	abstract = {Anonymous communication networks (ACNs) aim to thwart an adversary,
  who controls or observes chunks of the communication network,
  from determining the respective identities of two communicating parties.
  We focus on low-latency ACNs such as Tor, which target a practical level
  of anonymity without incurring an unacceptable transmission delay.

While several definitions have been proposed to quantify the level of anonymity
  provided by high-latency, message-centric ACNs (such as mix-nets and DC-nets),
  this approach is less relevant to Tor, where user--destination pairs communicate
  over secure overlay circuits. Moreover, existing evaluation methods of
  traffic analysis attacks on Tor appear somewhat ad hoc and fragmented.
  We propose a fair evaluation framework for such attacks against onion
  routing systems by identifying and discussing the crucial components
  for evaluation, including how to consider various adversarial goals,
  how to factor in the adversarial ability to collect information relevant
  to the attack, and how these components combine to suitable metrics to
  quantify the adversary{\textquoteright}s success.},
	isbn = {978-3-030-99276-7},
	issn = {0302-9743},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-99277-4_1},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99277-4_1},
	author = {Melloni, Alessandro and Stam, Martijn and Ytrehus, {\O}yvind},
	editor = {AlTawy, Riham and H{\"u}lsing, Andreas}
}
