@article {23491,
	title = {Demand Response Management in the Smart Grid in a Large Population Regime},
	journal = {IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid},
	volume = {7},
	year = {2016},
	month = {01/2016},
	pages = {189-199},
	publisher = {IEEE},
	abstract = {In this paper we introduce a hierarchical system model that captures the decision making processes involved in a network of multiple providers and a large number of consumers in the smart grid, incorporating multiple processes from power generation to market activities and to power consumption. We establish a Stackelberg game between providers and end-users, where the providers behave as leaders maximizing their profit, and end-users act as followers maximizing their individual welfare. We obtain closed-form expressions for the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game and prove that a unique equilibrium solution exists. In the large population regime, we show that higher number of providers help improve profits for the providers. This is inline with the goal of facilitating multiple distributed power generation units, one of the main design considerations in the smart grid. We further prove that there exists a unique number of providers that maximize their profits, and develop an iterative and distributed algorithm to obtain it. Finally, we provide numerical examples to illustrate the solutions and to corroborate the results.},
	keywords = {Consumer welfare, Demand response management, large population, profit optimization, Stackelberg game},
	author = {Maharjan, Sabita and Zhu, Quanyan and Zhang, Yan and Gjessing, Stein and Basar, Tamer}
}
@article {Simula.simula.1566,
	title = {Dependable Demand Response Management in the Smart Grid: a Stackelberg Game Approach},
	journal = {IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid},
	volume = {4},
	number = {1},
	year = {2013},
	pages = {120-132},
	abstract = {Demand Response Management (DRM) is a key component in the smart grid to effectively reduce power generation costs and user bills. However, it has been an open issue to address the DRM problem in a network of multiple utility companies and consumers where every entity is concerned about maximizing its own benefit. In this paper, we propose a Stackelberg game between utility companies and end-users to maximize the revenue of each utility company and the payoff of each user. We derive analytical results for the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game and prove that a unique solution exists. We develop a distributed algorithm which converges to the equilibrium with only local information available for both utility companies and end-users. Though DRM helps to facilitate the reliability of power supply, the smart grid can be succeptible to privacy and security issues because of communication links between the utility companies and the consumers. We study the impact of an attacker who can manipulate the price information from the utility companies. We also propose a scheme based on the concept of shared reserve power to improve the grid reliability and ensure its dependability.},
	author = {Maharjan, Sabita and Zhu, Quanyan and Zhang, Yan and Gjessing, Stein and Basar, Tamer}
}
