@book {43211,
	title = {Advances in Cryptology {\textendash} EUROCRYPT 2023},
	journal = {42nd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Lyon, France, April 23-27, 2023, Proceedings, Part I},
	volume = {14004},
	year = {2023},
	publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland},
	address = {Cham},
	keywords = {ciphertexts, communication protocols, Computer networks, Computer security, Cryptanalysis, Cryptography, Data mining, data security, Encryption, information theory, privacy preserving, public key cryptography},
	isbn = {978-3-031-30544-3},
	issn = {0302-9743},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-30545-0},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-30545-0},
	editor = {Hazay, Carmit and Stam, Martijn}
}
@book {43220,
	title = {Advances in Cryptology {\textendash} EUROCRYPT 2023},
	journal = {42nd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Lyon, France, April 23-27, 2023, Proceedings, Part III},
	volume = {14006},
	year = {2023},
	month = {04/2023},
	pages = {XVI, 670},
	publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland},
	address = {Cham},
	keywords = {ciphertexts, communication protocols, Computer networks, Computer security, Cryptanalysis, Cryptography, Data mining, data security, Encryption, information theory, privacy preserving, public key cryptography},
	isbn = {978-3-031-30619-8},
	issn = {0302-9743},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-30620-4},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-30620-4},
	editor = {Hazay, Carmit and Stam, Martijn}
}
@book {43212,
	title = {Advances in Cryptology {\textendash} EUROCRYPT 2023},
	journal = {42nd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Lyon, France, April 23-27, 2023, Proceedings, Part II},
	volume = {14005},
	year = {2023},
	month = {04/2023},
	pages = {XVI, 628},
	publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland},
	address = {Cham},
	keywords = {ciphertexts, communication protocols, Computer networks, Computer security, Cryptanalysis, Cryptography, Data mining, data security, Encryption, information theory, privacy preserving, public key cryptography},
	isbn = {978-3-031-30616-7},
	issn = {0302-9743},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-30617-4},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-30617-4},
	editor = {Hazay, Carmit and Stam, Martijn}
}
@inproceedings {43112,
	title = {Multi-Instance Secure Public-Key Encryption},
	journal = {PKC 2023, Part II},
	year = {2023},
	month = {05/2023},
	pages = {336-367},
	publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland},
	address = {Cham},
	abstract = {Mass surveillance targets many users at the same time with the goal of learning as much as possible. Intuitively, breaking many users{\textquoteright} cryptography simultaneously should be at least as hard as that of only breaking a single one, but ideally security degradation is gradual: an adversary ought to work harder to break more. Bellare, Ristenpart and Tessaro (Crypto{\textquoteright}12) introduced the notion of multi-instance security to capture the related concept for password hashing with salts. Auerbach, Giacon and Kiltz (Eurocrypt{\textquoteright}20) motivated the study of public key encryption (PKE) in the multi-instance setting, yet their technical results are exclusively stated in terms of key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), leaving a considerable gap. We investigate the multi-instance security of public key encryption. Our contributions are twofold. Firstly, we define and compare possible security notions for multi-instance PKE, where we include PKE schemes whose correctness is not perfect. Secondly, we observe that, in general, a hybrid encryption scheme of a multi-instance secure KEM and an arbitrary data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) is unlikely to inherit the KEM{\textquoteright}s multi-instance security. Yet, we show how with a suitable information-theoretic DEM, and a computationally secure key derivation function if need be, inheritance is possible. As far as we are aware, ours is the first inheritance result in the challenging multi-bit scenario.},
	keywords = {Hybrid Encryption, Mass Surveillance, Multi-Instance Security, Property Inheritance},
	isbn = {978-3-031-31370-7},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-31371-4_12},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31371-4_12},
	author = {Brunetta, Carlo and Heum, Hans and Stam, Martijn},
	editor = {Boldyreva, Alexandra and Kolesnikov, Vladimir}
}
@article {43327,
	title = {Pincering SKINNY by Exploiting   Slow Diffusion: Enhancing Differential Power Analysis with Cluster Graph Inference},
	journal = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
	volume = {2023},
	number = {4},
	year = {2023},
	publisher = {IACR},
	address = {Bochum, Germany},
	author = {Costes, Nicolas and Stam, Martijn}
}
@inproceedings {28409,
	title = {On Evaluating Anonymity of Onion Routing},
	journal = {Selected Areas in Cryptography (28th International Conference, Virtual Event, September 29 {\textendash} October 1, 2021, Revised Selected Papers)},
	volume = {13203},
	year = {2022},
	pages = {3-24},
	publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland},
	address = {Cham},
	abstract = {Anonymous communication networks (ACNs) aim to thwart an adversary,
  who controls or observes chunks of the communication network,
  from determining the respective identities of two communicating parties.
  We focus on low-latency ACNs such as Tor, which target a practical level
  of anonymity without incurring an unacceptable transmission delay.

While several definitions have been proposed to quantify the level of anonymity
  provided by high-latency, message-centric ACNs (such as mix-nets and DC-nets),
  this approach is less relevant to Tor, where user--destination pairs communicate
  over secure overlay circuits. Moreover, existing evaluation methods of
  traffic analysis attacks on Tor appear somewhat ad hoc and fragmented.
  We propose a fair evaluation framework for such attacks against onion
  routing systems by identifying and discussing the crucial components
  for evaluation, including how to consider various adversarial goals,
  how to factor in the adversarial ability to collect information relevant
  to the attack, and how these components combine to suitable metrics to
  quantify the adversary{\textquoteright}s success.},
	isbn = {978-3-030-99276-7},
	issn = {0302-9743},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-99277-4_1},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99277-4_1},
	author = {Melloni, Alessandro and Stam, Martijn and Ytrehus, {\O}yvind},
	editor = {AlTawy, Riham and H{\"u}lsing, Andreas}
}
@book {28366,
	title = {Computational Cryptography: Algorithmic Aspects of Cryptology},
	journal = {London Mathematical Society Lecture Note Series },
	volume = {469},
	number = {469},
	year = {2021},
	month = {11/2021},
	pages = {388 + xii},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	edition = {1},
	address = {Cambridge, UK},
	abstract = {The area of computational cryptography is dedicated to the development of effective methods in algorithmic number theory that improve implementation of cryptosystems or further their cryptanalysis. This book is a tribute to Arjen K. Lenstra, one of the key contributors to the field, on the occasion of his 65th birthday, covering his best-known scientific achievements in the field. Students and security engineers will appreciate this no-nonsense introduction to the hard mathematical problems used in cryptography and on which cybersecurity is built, as well as the overview of recent advances on how to solve these problems from both theoretical and practical applied perspectives. Beginning with polynomials, the book moves on to the celebrated Lenstra{\textendash}Lenstra{\textendash}Lov{\'a}sz lattice reduction algorithm, and then progresses to integer factorization and the impact of these methods to the selection of strong cryptographic keys for usage in widely used standards.},
	isbn = {9781108795937},
	doi = {10.1017/9781108854207},
	url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781108854207/type/book},
	editor = {Bos, Joppe and Stam, Martijn}
}
@inbook {28367,
	title = {Introduction},
	booktitle = {Computational Cryptography: Algorithmic Aspects of Cryptology},
	number = {469},
	year = {2021},
	month = {11/2021},
	pages = {1 - 12},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	organization = {Cambridge University Press},
	edition = {1},
	chapter = {1},
	isbn = {9781108795937},
	doi = {10.1017/9781108854207.002},
	url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781108854207/type/bookhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781108854207\%23c1/type/book_part},
	author = {Bos, Joppe and Stam, Martijn},
	editor = {Bos, Joppe and Stam, Martijn}
}
@inproceedings {28379,
	title = {Tightness Subtleties for Multi-user PKE Notions},
	journal = {18th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding},
	volume = {13129},
	year = {2021},
	month = {12/2021},
	pages = {75 - 104},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	edition = {18},
	address = {Cham},
	abstract = {Public key encryption schemes are increasingly being studied concretely, with an emphasis on tight bounds even in a multi-user setting. Here, two types of formalization have emerged, one with a single challenge bit and one with multiple challenge bits. Another modelling choice is whether to allow key corruptions or not. How tightly the various notions relate to each other has hitherto not been studied in detail. We show that in the absence of corruptions, single-bit left-or-right indistinguishability is the preferred notion, as it tightly implies the other (corruption-less) notions. However, in the presence of corruptions, this implication no longer holds; we suggest the use of a more general notion that tightly implies both existing options. Furthermore, for completeness we study how the relationship between left-or-right versus real-or-random evolves in the multi-user PKE setting.},
	isbn = {978-3-030-92640-3},
	issn = {0302-9743},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-92641-010.1007/978-3-030-92641-0_5},
	url = {https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-92641-0_5},
	author = {Heum, Hans and Stam, Martijn},
	editor = {Paterson, Maura}
}
@inbook {43219,
	title = {XTR and Tori},
	booktitle = {Computational Cryptography: Algorithmic Aspects of Cryptology},
	year = {2021},
	month = {11/2021},
	pages = {293 - 313},
	publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
	organization = {Cambridge University Press},
	edition = {1},
	chapter = {10},
	address = {Cambridge, UK},
	isbn = {9781108795937},
	doi = {10.1017/978110885420710.1017/9781108854207.013},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108854207.013},
	author = {Stam, Martijn},
	editor = {Bos, Joppe and Stam, Martijn}
}
@article {27551,
	title = {Redundant Code-based Masking Revisited},
	journal = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
	volume = {2021},
	year = {2020},
	month = {12/2020},
	pages = {426 - 450},
	publisher = {Ruhr-University of Bochum},
	abstract = {Masking schemes are a popular countermeasure against side-channel attacks. To mask bytes, the two classical options are Boolean masking and polynomial masking. The latter lends itself to redundant masking, where leakage emanates from more shares than are strictly necessary to reconstruct, raising the obvious question how well such {\textquotedblleft}redundant{\textquotedblright} leakage can be exploited by a side-channel adversary. We revisit the recent work by Chabanne et al. (CHES{\textquoteright}18) and show that, contrary to their conclusions, said leakage can{\textemdash}in theory{\textemdash}always be exploited. For the Hamming weight scenario in the low-noise regime, we heuristically determine how security degrades in terms of the number of redundant shares for first and second order secure polynomial masking schemes.Furthermore, we leverage a well-established link between linear secret sharing schemes and coding theory to determine when different masking schemes will end up with essentially equivalent leakage profiles. Surprisingly, we conclude that for typical field sizes and security orders, Boolean masking is a special case of polynomial masking. We also identify quasi-Boolean masking schemes as a special class of redundant polynomial masking and point out that the popular {\textquotedblleft}Frobenius-stable{\textquotedblright} sets of interpolations points typically lead to such quasi-Boolean masking schemes, with subsequent degraded leakage performance.},
	keywords = {Coding Theory, Masking, Shamir Secret Sharing, Success Rate},
	issn = {2569-2925},
	doi = {10.46586/tches.v2021.i1.426-450},
	url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8740},
	author = {Costes, Nicolas and Stam, Martijn}
}
@inproceedings {DBLP:conf/indocrypt/HovdS20,
	title = {Vetted Encryption},
	journal = {Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2020 - 21st International Conference on Cryptology in India},
	volume = {12578},
	year = {2020},
	pages = {488{\textendash}507},
	publisher = {Springer},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-65277-7_22},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65277-7_22},
	author = {Martha Norberg {Hovd} and Stam, Martijn},
	editor = {Bhargavan, Karthikeyan and Oswald, Elisabeth and Prabhakaran, Manoj}
}
